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The bursting of the asset and real estate market bubbles in 1990 and 1991 marked the 
conclusion of Japan’s momentous postwar economic growth and ushered in a new period of 
economic stagnation and malaise. This paper serves as an overview of the forthcoming 11 
chapter publication: Reviving Japan’s Economy: Problems and Prescriptions, co-edited by 
Takatoshi Ito, Hugh Patrick, and David Weinstein. Here we provide a brief summary of the 
stagnation and offer some broad policy recommendations derived from the analysis contained 
in the volume. The 14 years, from 1991, of economic malaise characterized by falling prices, 
worsening deflation, failing banks and life insurance companies, and rising unemployment and 
underemployment must be understood in the context of a long-term, multifaceted, national 
transformation process- economic, demographic, social, and political. Economic 
underperformance was exacerbated by poor policy decisions, notably the premature tightening 
monetary policy in the midst of ongoing deflation. The very slow rate of corporate and 
government restructuring, and the protracted evolution of institutional and corporate 
governance also played a significant role. The economy recovered well between early 2002 and 
the first quarter of 2004 but subsequently stalled during the year. Japan’s economy has yet to 
return to a path of full-employment and self-sustained growth. The highest priorities are to 
achieve sufficient aggregate demand, essential to restore full employment growth; to end 
persisting deflation; and to promote both private sector and governmental institution 
restructuring. There will be no economic basis for a fiscal crisis so long as Japan commits to 
restoring fiscal balance in the very long run. Because the nation’s economic and social 
fundamentals remain strong, we are optimistic that Japan will emerge from this transformation 









With the bursting of its asset and real estate market bubble in 1990 and 1991, Japan’s economy 
entered into a long period of mediocre performance that by 2002 and early 2003 was 
accompanied by growing pessimism about Japan’s future among scholars, policy makers, and 
economic commentators, both inside and outside Japan.  This pessimism was shared by the 
Japanese public.  The growth rate had become negative again, banks were failing, and stock 
prices were plummeting to the level of a decade earlier.  Deflation seemed to be worsening, 
while the unemployment rate was increasing to an unprecedented level.  Monetary policy 
seemed impotent after the benchmark interest rate became zero.  Fiscal policy seemed to be 
powerless as large government spending and tax cut packages failed to lift the economy long 
enough to generate a self-sustaining recovery.   
Moreover, Japan is in the midst of a profound transformation process—economic, 
demographic, social, and political—-that will take several decades to complete.  These 
fundamental forces are deeply intertwined with the cyclical and structural roots of Japan’s 
fourteen-year malaise. 
 By mid-2004 there was growing optimism that the economy was finally emerging 
from its 13 years of poor performance to return to sustained growth, but also nagging doubts 
persisted that this recovery was no more than a cyclical upturn.  Earlier recovery attempts in 
1996 and 2000 had been followed by disappointing recessions.  This proved to be true once 
again, as a strong first quarter in 2004 was followed by three quarters of essentially flat growth. 
While the economy will probably recover once again in 2005, it seems unlikely that the 
recovery will be sufficiently strong or durable to get back onto the path of sustained growth to 
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 achieve the economy’s full potential. Our deep concern is that fundamental economic and 
institutional problems will remain inadequately address, possibly inducing another crisis (see 
Patrick, 2004). 
Japan does have feasible, optimal economic policy solutions to the major economic 
problems and issues that have undermined its fundamental economic strengths since the early 
1990s.  Even if Japan has entered a period of improving economic conditions, and that is not 
to be taken for granted, it has not yet adopted the kinds of policies that would maximize its 
growth potential, improve its people’s quality of life, and contribute to strengthening the global 
economy. The basic purpose of this book, and the two-year research project on which it is 
based, is to develop and recommend policy solutions to return Japan to long-run sustainable 
economic growth.  The following chapters, written by outstanding Japanese and American 
economists are forward-looking, but founded on a careful analysis of Japan’s recent economic 
history. 
 As general context for the following chapters, in this introduction we outline the 
long-term economic transformation now underway and relate the major economic problems in 
Japan’s 14 years of malaise to that extended process.  Subsequent chapters in the book cover 
the costs of the economic malaise, aggregate demand and macroeconomic policy, monetary 
policy, financial system difficulties, corporate restructuring and financing, and Japan’s new 
trade policy.  Some of the analyses found in subsequent chapters are incorporated into this 
overarching discussion, which ends by summarizing a few of the major conclusions reached by 
the authors. 
 This collaborative project has involved deep and sustained interactions among the 15 
well-known Japanese and American economists who authored these 11 chapters.  We share a 
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 high degree of agreement but certainly not complete consensus on all the proposed policy 
solutions to Japan’s economic problems, and there has been no effort to force consensus.  The 
authors are responsible for their own studies, and we bear sole responsibility for this chapter. 
 
1.0  Japan’s Ongoing Fundamental Transformation 
 
While a great deal of analytical emphasis has appropriately focused on the cyclical and 
structural difficulties of Japan’s malaise since 1990, it is important to recognize the more 
fundamental long-term forces at work.  Three major economic transformations have been 
underway: the completion of the catch-up process of fast growth as Japan changed from a low 
income country to a mature economy with a high per capita GDP and standard of living; the 
ongoing demographic transition to long life expectancy, low fertility, and an aging population; 
and the evolution from a system of relational capitalism to market-based capitalism.  (For an 
even longer-term history of the evolution of Japan’s economic system, see Teranishi 2005.) 
 Japan’s extraordinarily successful postwar economic growth was based significantly 
on its ability to close the huge gap between the Japanese level of productivity and technology 
and the world’s productivity frontier.  This was achieved through the effective utilization of an 
initially cheap, abundant and skilled labor force; entrepreneurial business investment that 
applied newly available technologies; a rapidly increasing (and ultimately) very high saving 
rate that provided domestic financing for the burgeoning rate of business investment, the 
development of synergistic postwar economic institutions and supportive government economic 
policies.  By the mid-1970s, Japan had caught up with the West, becoming the world’s second 
largest economy with European levels of per capita GDP and a high standard of living.  From 
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 1980 on, Japan became an increasingly large foreign investor, both direct and portfolio, and by 
the 1990s by a wide margin had become the world’s largest creditor nation. Japanese banks 
were the largest in the world and had very high credit ratings, and Japanese institutions were 
buying prime properties worldwide.  Now, after more than a decade of stagnation, there is a 
widespread sense in Japan that it has failed to make a transition from a super-effective 
manufacturing economy (exemplified by firms such as Toyota, Sony, and Nippon Steel)  to a 
high-tech service-oriented economy (characterized by companies like Microsoft, Goldman 
Sachs and CNN). 
 In the high growth, catch-up era, from the early 1950s to the mid 1970s, Japan’s 
postwar economic system developed and flourished.  It was founded, especially for big 
business, on the permanent employment system of industrial relations, the bank-based system 
of corporate finance, and the separation of shareholder ownership and management control.  
Large firms then and still now are controlled by entrenched professional managers, trained and 
promoted from within to serve as chief executive officers and board members.  Any weak 
firms and banks were merged with healthy ones through backroom discussions and the 
encouragement of regulators.  Declining industries, such as coal, changed through a very 
gradual process; a few industries that were obviously uncompetitive, such as aluminum, shrank 
much more rapidly.  The economic system was opaque and cozy, with power centered on 
business leaders, central government officials, and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders.  
The LDP was the sole governing party from its 1955 inception until 1993, and since 1996 has 
continued to be the dominant leader in a series of coalition governments.  
 In some respects, by the late 1980s Japan had become a victim of its own economic 
success. The economy grew too large to be managed effectively based on personal relationships. 
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 Japan was gradually moving toward a more market-based, open economic system. For good 
domestic and foreign policy reasons, the government initially reduced its early postwar controls 
over prices, then foreign exchange rates, foreign capital flows, and trade in manufactured goods.  
Piecemeal financial deregulation, a twenty-year process, began in the mid-1970s.  Many 
government enterprises were partially or totally privatized in the 1980s.  Airlines are now 
100% privately owned; railway companies are partially private; and the formerly monopolistic 
domestic and international telephone companies are substantially privatized and compete 
against private communication companies.  Other deregulation has taken place, though many 
regulations persist.   
 In Japan, as in other countries, development and growth brought major changes in the 
economic structure.  Agriculture declined to minor economic significance (but remains 
politically potent); the share of the manufacturing sector rose sharply and then gradually 
declined; and the portion of the economy centered on business and personal services naturally 
rose.  With wages increasing continually and the yen appreciating, by the 1980s Japan no 
longer was a cheap-labor economy; labor-intensive industries, facing the onslaught of cheap 
imports, increasingly invested abroad while declining at home.  One of Japan’s major 
anomalies is that the productivity gap between manufacturing, especially of exports, and 
services, mostly non-tradables, has remained very wide, and still is the most extreme of any 
major OECD economy.  This wide gap suggests both a potential for better growth through 
more effective resource reallocation and the real difficulties of major structural adjustment for 
low-productivity service industries, especially retail and wholesale trade, and construction.   
 It is our view that Japan successfully overcame several economic challenges in the 
past, but since the 1990s Japan has really stumbled.  We should not forget how Japan 
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 overcame difficulties in the 1970s and 1980s (for a comprehensive review of the Japanese 
economy before the bubbles burst in 1990 and 1991, see Ito 1992). The economic turmoil of 
the 1970s brought on the first set of challenges, and the mid-1970s was the first inflection point 
for the Japanese economy.  The yen had just been floated for the first time since World War II.  
Inflation reached 30% in 1973, due partly to monetary easing the year before but particularly 
due to the quadrupling of oil prices.  Strong tightening to halt inflation caused negative growth 
in 1974 for the first time in the postwar period.  Following the first oil crisis, business 
optimism and investment slowed more than the gradual reduction in household saving rates.  
The energy resource constraint and increasingly obvious pollution problems put a brake on the 
overwhelmingly growth-oriented focus of corporate management and government policy. 
 Deficit-financing government bonds were issued in increasingly large amounts for the 
rest of the 1970s to help the economy regain its growth path.  Private sector aggregate demand 
was no longer excessive relative to supply, and weakened sufficiently to require government 
macroeconomic stimulus.  Credit rationing was no longer necessary, and credit became easy; 
the Keynesian paradox of excess saving, initially perceived to be cyclical, became long-term 
and structural. Japan, as the world’s second largest economy, has from the 1980s been unable to 
export all of its excess domestic savings because the requisite concomitant huge trade (and 
current account) surpluses were and are unacceptable to the United States and Europe.  
 The second big challenge the Japanese economy faced was in the mid-1980s, when 
yen appreciation brought about another big shock to the Japanese economy.  The first half of 
the 1980s were marked by dollar appreciation vis-à-vis all other currencies.  Japanese exports 
soared and the economy enjoyed rapid growth.  By 1984 Japan’s current account in its balance 
of payments had turned to substantial surpluses, while that of the United States had turned to 
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 large deficits.  The Plaza Accord of September 1985 was supposed to correct exchange rate 
misalignments and restore equilibrium exchange rates for the major OECD countries.  The 
yen appreciated from 260 per dollar in February 1985 to 240 just before the Plaza Accord in 
September, and to 200 in December 1985.  It then kept appreciating, in part because of the 
collapse of oil prices, and reached a then record high of 150 yen per dollar by the fourth quarter 
of 1986. 
 Given the severe appreciation in the yen’s value, fears arose about the collapse of 
Japanese exports and the economy in general, but the economy was more resilient than 
expected. Monetary policy was greatly eased from 1985, and the economy embarked on rapid 
growth based on private demand. Accordingly, the government was able to pursue fiscal 
consolidation throughout the 1980s, and achieved a balanced, even surplus, budget by the end 
of the decade.  Japan recovered from the yen appreciation of 1985-86, and from spillover 
effects from the American stock-price declines of late 1987 (Black Monday, October 19, and its 
aftermath).  At the end of 1989, the Japanese economy was at the peak of its asset-price and 
real estate bubbles.  Land and stock prices had risen four-fold in 6 years.  No one would dare 
to forecast those gains would be erased in the following 13 years. 
 The bursting of the bubble and the ensuing stagnation of the 1990s through 2004 has 
been the third and biggest challenge faced by postwar Japan, and it has been much more 
protracted than necessary.  Asset price declines resulted in huge amounts of non-performing 
loans, giving rise to the banking crisis of 1997-98.  After the basic interest rate became zero, 
monetary policy was a much less effective tool since 1995.  Fiscal deficits and government 
debt have become so large that further fiscal stimulus has not seemed feasible to policy makers. 
 Japan’s decades of success led to some fundamental assumptions that attained the 
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 status of myth before being seen as mistaken.  The two myths of the late 1980s were that land 
prices would never decline, since they never really had for the entire 40-year postwar period; 
and that rapid GDP growth would continue indefinitely.  The 1990-91 bursting of the twin 
bubbles shattered the land price myth, and raised doubts about maintaining an annual growth 
rate greater than 4%.  Nonetheless, faith in naturally renewed growth led to mythical 
expectations during the 1990s that growth would be restored fairly soon and the economy 
would recover; thus it was felt that painful business and government structural adjustments 
could be postponed until conditions improved, and that was how decision makers behaved 
through much of the 1990s. We are concerned that excessively optimistic perceptions are 
widely voiced once again in early 2005.  
 
1.1  Demography 
 
Japan’s long-term demographic transformation is as profound as its economic one.  Over the 
course of its modern economic development, Japan has transited from relatively high birth and 
death rates, low life expectancy, a young population, and moderate population growth to a 
nation of very low death rates, even lower birth rates, and the longest life expectancy in the 
world. As a result, Japan has a rapidly aging population.  Since 1995 there has been an 
absolute decline in the working-age group (15-64), and by 2007 population size will peak.  
Population stability occurs when the completed fertility rate is about 2.1; currently it is only 
1.29. The Japanese level is comparable to Italy’s very low fertility rate, both of which are 
among the lowest of OECD countries. 
 In this volume Broda and Weinstein cogently point out how unrealistic is the common 
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 assumption that Japan’s low birth rates will persist indefinitely; that means that the Japanese 
eventually will disappear.  Changes in demographic behavior are typically long run, but it is 
reasonable to assume that some decades hence, the ever-richer Japanese will desire to have 
more children and the population will stabilize.  Or perhaps Japan will decide to give up 
ethnic homogeneity and accept large numbers of permanent immigrants, as Higuchi and 
Hashimoto suggest in their chapter. Demographic assumptions are important in analyzing 
long-run issues of fiscal sustainability, namely how much government revenues will have to be 
raised as a share of GDP to meet social security commitments to the elderly. 
 High or low dependency rates -- the number of children and elderly as a percentage of 
the working-age population -- provide information on growth prospects and the needs for 
government expenditures (including income transfers), but depending on the characteristics of 
the social security system these dependency rates do not necessarily imply fiscal and economic 
problems.  However, the current Japanese social security system, designed as a pay-as-you-go 
program, is already in deep trouble.  Too many of the young are not paying in premiums, and 
corporations are exiting the corporate part of the social security system when possible.  
Clearly the institutional arrangements and the implementation of policies have to be improved, 
an issue we stress even though it transcends the topics of this book. 
 
1.2  Transformation Policy Choices 
 
One key issue for Japan’s long-term economic performance is the degree and nature of the 
factors determining potential growth:  changes in labor supply, capital investment per worker, 
and technological change (total factor productivity increase).  Another key issue is what 
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 portion of GDP society decides to have the government spend on its people – elderly, young, 
and those of working age.  The ratio can be high as in Scandinavia, quite high as in many 
European countries, or more modest as in Japan and the United States.  A third issue is how to 
pursue policies that assure labor, capital, and other resources are fully and efficiently utilized.   
 What proportion of GDP will the Japanese be willing to transfer to their elderly in the 
form of public pensions and health care?  Should Japan maintain high ethnic homogeneity, or 
should it encourage substantial permanent immigration?  Should it provide incentives to 
increase fertility, including more adequate support structures for working mothers and their 
children?  How much should politically-important but economically-inefficient sectors and 
activities be subsidized, and how can such programs be made more efficient given appropriate 
transfer programs?  As economists, we are good at making recommendations on efficiency 
issues, but are hesitant to make recommendations about these important social choices. 
 While beyond the scope of this study, social and political changes are a major 
component of the transformation process.  We note several important trends.  Today’s young 
Japanese grew up in relative comfort, in contrast to their grandparents’ experiences in a 
war-ravaged 1940s Japan and their parents’ experience in the 1950s and 1960s.  In 
contemporary Japan young adults are considerably better educated, have more international 
awareness and experience, and aspire to realize their own career goals.  Today’s young adults 
have a wide range of interests and lifestyle opportunities, although they have been constrained 
by their poor employment situation. We do not know what figures most importantly in their 
life-cycle decisions, but the fact is that they are postponing marriage: half the Japanese women 
and men aged 30 are not married. 
 Given that the current young adult generation is affluent and behaves quite differently 
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 than previous generations, Japan’s economic structure, as well as its social structure, may well 
change in the future. The saving rate may drop in addition to a natural decline due to an aging 
society, and employment practices may change as more young people, voluntarily and 
involuntarily, find only temporary, part-time jobs as their first professional positions.  Higuchi 
and Hashimoto find this trend very unsatisfactory for effective career development, as 
discussed in chapter 10. 
 The postwar Japanese family model -- analogous to the American model of the 1950s 
-- of the husband working permanently for a large organization and the wife at home raising 
their two or three children was always an inaccurate stereotype.  Most Japanese men have 
always worked for small- or medium-sized enterprises and changed jobs from time to time; 
some two-fifths of married women re-enter the work force, usually part-time, once their 
children start school.  However, Japan is the only advanced country that has had a significant 
drop in the female labor force participation rate for the child-bearing and child-caring age 
group.  It is debatable whether this is a voluntary choice or involuntary. 
 
1.3  Political Change 
 
In the 1990s there was a significant change in the political environment.  The Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), always a collection of factions, began to split.  In the July 1993 
elections, the LDP lost its majority in the Lower House.  LDP splinter groups formed 
coalitions with other parties to obtain a majority in the Diet, and in August Morihiro Hosokawa 
became the first non-LDP prime minister since 1955.  However, that coalition collapsed after 
20 months.  The LDP first managed to form a coalition with the Socialist Party (now the 
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 Social Democrat Party of Japan) yielding the prime ministership to its leader, Tomiichi 
Murayama.  Since January 1996 the LDP has formed coalitions with several smaller parties, 
including now the New Komei Party, and regained the prime ministership. 
 The major opposition party in the 1950s through 1970s, the Socialist Party [later 
renamed the Social Democrat Party (SDP)] participated in the coalition government in the early 
1990s, but later essentially disappeared.  By 2003, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) had 
emerged as a rival to the LDP.  The DPJ is an amalgam of members of most pre-1993 
opposition parties (other than the SDP and Communists), newly elected members, and those 
LDP splinter groups that did not rejoin the LDP. 
 In the November 2003 House of Representative election and the July 2004 House of 
Councilors election, the DPJ actually gained more votes in total than the LDP, but these 
victories did not convert to control of either house.  For both houses, most members are 
elected by districts, the rest proportionally.  For the lower house since 1994 the districts are 
single-seat (replacing multi-member districts); for the upper, they are prefectual.  
 While many commentators observe that Japan is approaching a “two-party system” 
like the United States, one conspicuous difference is that currently the small, but well organized 
New Komei Party holds balancing power in the Diet. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s term 
as LDP president and hence as prime minister ends in September 2006. His successor is far 
from certain. The possibility of further party member realignments based more on common 






1.4  International Context 
 
Japan’s demographic and political transformation is not unique, and not isolated.  The world 
has changed dramatically as well.  The cold war confrontation between the United States and 
the former Soviet Union ended in the late 1980s, and the United States has emerged as the sole 
military hegemon.  The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 
fundamentally altered American foreign policy, with repercussions for all countries. 
 The world trading system has been strengthened by the creation in 1995 of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) out of its forerunner, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT), despite its remaining limitations.  Global financial markets have become increasingly 
important:  huge short-term and long-term capital flows, exchange rate movements, and 
expectations about interest rates, now strongly affect the economic policies of all major nations.  
The creation of the system of arbitration panels under the WTO has significantly decreased the 
chance of unilateral actions in bilateral trade disputes.  Some prominent trade disputes 
between Japan and the United States, such as the Fuji versus Kodak film case, were settled 
under the WTO panel in favor of Japan. 
 In addition to these global multinational approaches, regional approaches to trade have 
proliferated.  One of the most important of these is the North American Free Trade Agreement 
among the United States, Canada, and Mexico.  Moreover the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas (FTAA) is being negotiated.  The FTAA will cover the entire western hemisphere 
from Canada to Argentina.  An even more important regional trading group is the European 
Union; with its 2004 expansion from 15 to 25 members, most of Europe and much of its 
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 periphery are now one market.  
 In East Asia, while Japan remains the largest and by far the most technologically 
sophisticated economy, the big change is the economic rise of China.  The Chinese economy 
has grown at almost 10 percent annually over the past two decades, just like Japan in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  China has joined the WTO, and has become a major factor in regional and global 
trade.  Given its still low level of income and its still huge numbers of rural workers, China 
has the potential to continue to grow rapidly for another two decades.  China provides 
Japanese companies with both great economic challenges and opportunities.  As the Japanese 
experience over the past two decades well demonstrates, a rapidly growing large economy is 
better for the world economy than a slowly growing one. 
 The prospects of North Korean nuclear capability have added a new security 
dimension to regional cooperation.  If anything, the North Korean issue has strengthened the 
security alliance between Japan and the United States.  At the same time, the six-party talks 
under Chinese leadership are a new approach to regional security cooperation.  However, each 
country— North Korea, China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Russia—has its own 
interests and anxieties.  With a strong economy, many South Koreans now have little sense of 
military threat from North Korea and are increasingly sympathetic to their North Korean 
brethren, as reflected in the last presidential election.  We live in an uncertain world and, as 
various pundits have articulated, the future of East Asia is more uncertain than its past. 
 
2  Economic Malaise Since 1990 
 
 The Japanese economy has performed poorly over the 14 years since 1991.  It has suffered 
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 the malaise of inadequate growth, a soaring unemployment rate and deepening 
under-employment, bank failures, slow and inadequate corporate restructuring, sub-optimal 
resource allocation, and slow, protracted institutional and structural reforms.  Despite 
immense macroeconomic stimulus, policies of forbearance, relationship-based inertia and 
policy mistakes have contributed to the lengthy persistence of this poor performance.  Termed 
by many as stagnation, though certainly not collapse, the “lost decade” became a popular 
nickname for this stalled period of economic growth.  We prefer to term the 1990s as a decade 
of underperformance and malaise, since in fact many institutional and other changes took place.  
(There are many studies of the Japanese economy in the 1990s; see for example, Blumstrom et 
al, 2003; Cargill et al 1997, 2001; Katz 1998, 2003; Lincoln 1999; OECD, 2004; Porter et al, 
2000; Posen 1998; and Saxonhouse and Stern, 2003.) Indeed, the succession of recoveries and 
recessions in the first five years of the 21st century undermine predominant focus on the 1990s; 
we now have to think of Japan’s underperformance extending at least 15 years rather than 10. 
 While certainly influenced by the specifics of Japan’s long-run transformation process, 
all the problems recounted above have been made substantially worse by poor economic 
performance since 1991.  A variety of forces have been at work to undermine Japan’s 
economy.  The bursting of the huge real estate and stock market bubbles in 1990-91 resulted 
in severe balance sheet and non-performing loan problems for banks, other financial 
institutions, and corporations.  Given the excess of borrowing and irrational exuberance over 
real estate and stocks in the 1980s, the collapse of asset markets was inevitable, but major 
policy mistakes were made in handling the bursting of the bubbles.  An increasingly huge 
non-performing loan problem was hidden for too long, and has been addressed in wrong ways; 
a new financial regime, based on an arm’s length relationship between the regulator and the 
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 regulated, has been very slow to emerge.  In 1995 the Ministry of Finance declared that none 
of Japan’s 20 major banks would fail, but Hokkaido Takushoku Bank suddenly failed in 
November 1997.  Subsequently, the Ministry of Finance's regulatory functions were separated 
out into the new, cabinet-level Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA).  Several more big banks 
failed, and others merged.  Japan will soon have three major banking groups representing 
most banking sector assets, in addition to the still huge postal savings system.  
 Japan has been caught in the combination of these inadequacies and of the long-run 
fundamental transformation discussed above.  While the economy cyclically rebounded 
between the early 2002 trough and the first quarter of 2004, the subsequent abruptly stalled 
economic performance for the rest of 2004 is indicative of the reality that major economic 
problems persist.  As discussed below, aggregate demand remains inadequate; deflation has 
yet to end; land prices continue to decline; corporate, financial institution, and public sector 
restructuring is far from completed; and unemployment, under-employment, and misallocated 
labor and capital are particularly serious.   
 It is clear that solid aggregate demand and good, sustained growth will contribute 
significantly to the solution of Japan’s economic problems.  Growth reduces adjustment costs, 
undergirds financial restructuring, and enhances the effectiveness and efficiency of markets for 
goods, services, labor, land, and capital.  However, growth alone is not enough.  Supply-side 
improvements – efficiency-enhancing deregulation and restructuring – must go hand in hand 
with development and maintenance of inadequate aggregate demand, in both the near-term and 
the longer-run. Corporate restructuring destroys jobs in the short-run while creating them in the 
long-run.  This means social safety nets need to be better designed and deployed.   
 Japan’s macroeconomic difficulties have been deeply intertwined with the weakening 
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 of the Japanese financial system.  In 1990 Japan’s banks and life insurance companies were 
considered to be not only the largest but the strongest in the world.  Today, these financial 
institutions are still huge, but recognized as the weakest of any advanced industrial nation.  
Bank lending to business has declined steadily.  Banks hold a large amount of government 
bonds and equities, but have failed to develop fee businesses sufficiently.  Their balance 
sheets are still greatly at risk from securities market fluctuations.  Japan’s government is an 
exceptionally large financial intermediary, crowding out private-sector institutions, rather than 
complementing them by serving areas characterized by market failures.  Government financial 
institutions, with a huge share of household deposits and life insurance policies held in the 
postal savings system, account for some 40% of all loans, and are especially important 
mortgage lenders to households and to smaller business enterprises.  As Japan’s private sector 
financial system has been fundamentally deregulated and liberalized, many government 
financial institutions have been rendered weak and redundant as their economic rationale has 
evaporated. 
 While moving ahead slowly and cautiously on domestic structural reform, the 
Japanese government has embarked on a bold new foreign trade policy, initiating negotiations 
for bilateral (and perhaps eventually regional) free trade areas (FTAs) or more comprehensive, 
regional trading agreements.  These new policies and the issues they raise are discussed by 
Urata in chapter 11.  Whether this new approach is an appropriate trade strategy, and whether 
it will be complementary to, or competitive with, Japan's global commitments and objectives 
under the WTO remains to be seen; certainly it is parallel to the earlier North American and 
European Union regional trade policy commitments.  The major stumbling block for Japanese 
trade policy continues to be the still-high degree of protection provided small and very 
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 inefficient, but politically powerful, agricultural, forestry, and fishery interests. 
 
2.1  The Costs of Japan’s Long Malaise 
 
The costs of Japan’s poor economic performance and slowness to adjust since 1991 are not 
hidden but are not necessarily obvious.  Despite widespread fears and even dire predictions, 
the economy did not collapse.  While there certainly have been crises for individual 
companies and even some government institutions, no systemic crisis has occurred.  The 
closest call was in the banking and financial systems between September 1997 and March 1998, 
but a full-fledged crisis, such as a widespread bank run, was averted.  Nonetheless, we can 
conceive of possible adverse scenarios in which large unexpected shocks could create 
conditions that might precipitate a collapse, such as another major Tokyo earthquake, 
hyperinflation, or war. 
 Probably the greatest cost of the economic malaise has been the GDP foregone due to 
below-potential growth for so many years.  Japan’s GDP could be on the order of 25% higher 
today if the economy had achieved its growth potential. Its high standard of living could be 
significantly higher. 
 In human terms, Japan’s most serious problem is a combination of unemployment, 
under-employment, and misallocated labor.  The recent reduction in the reported 
unemployment rate from the 5.5% peak in 2002 to 4.5% in January 2005 is an improvement, 
but it masks major declines in the quality of jobs and in the withdrawal of persons of working 
age (15-64) from the labor force.  As Higuchi and Hashimoto emphasize in chapter 10, 
between 1997 and 2003 the labor force participation rate dropped to its lowest level ever.  
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 During this period, employment declined by 2.4 million persons:  1.2 million withdrew or 
never entered the labor force, and 1.2 million became unemployed.  Worse, from 1997 
full-time regular employment until the beginning of 2005 continually decreased, while 
part-time and temporary employment has risen steadily and now comprises more than a quarter 
of total employment.  Compared to full-time male employees, the hourly wages of part-time 
male workers are only 51%, full-time female workers only 66%, and part-time female workers 
only 44%. Large department stores now rely predominantly on part-time workers. More 
broadly, firms with more than 1000 employees are replacing retiring full-time workers with 
part-timers; whereas part-time employees comprised 3.9% of their workers 1995, this ratio 
increased to 8.6% in 2002, and is even higher today.  The Japanese economy has been 
experiencing de facto wage reduction, reflecting weak labor demand and slow productivity 
growth.  This wage reduction is good in the sense that the unemployment rate is less high than 
otherwise, but bad in the sense that the full potential of the work force is not being realized 
because of inadequate demand for labor. 
 In longer-term perspective, the weak labor market has harmed the young - those aged 
15 to 24 years - disproportionately.  The unemployment rate for 20-24 year olds not in school 
in 2002 was 9.3%, but in 1990 this rate was only 3.8%; for those aged 15-19 years, the 
corresponding figures are 12.8% in 2002 versus 6.6% in 1990.  The “idle labor” rate, 
measuring those neither in school nor in the labor force, for those aged 20-24 years was 17.0% 
in 2002, up from 11.3% in 1990; for those aged 15-19 years, 24.3% in 2002, up from 14.6% in 
1990.  Equally serious has been the increase in young part-time workers.  In 2003, male 
part-timers aged 20-24 comprised 28.3% of their employed age group, up from 14.9% in 1990 
and even lower levels from earlier periods.  Some 35.2% of female workers aged 20-24 were 
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 part-timers in 2003, up from 18.4% in 1990 and lower ratios earlier.  54.5% of these young 
part-time workers are female. 
 Some of these young people have voluntarily chosen alternative lifestyles made 
possible by high wages in an affluent society.  The estimates of the non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment (NAIRU) has risen from its exceptionally low earlier levels, but at about 
3.5% it remains significantly below the actual unemployment rate.  Survey data indicate most 
young people would prefer full-time regular jobs.  The significant rise in the proportion of 
part-time workers, a category especially comprised of young people, reflects the still weak 
demand for labor.  In the longer run, this underemployment means that young workers are not 
obtaining the benefits of skill development through on-the-job training.  This is a major 
hidden cost of Japan’s mediocre economic performance since 1991 (in addition to the Higuchi 
and Hashimoto chapter, see Sato and Sato, 1997). 
 
3  Aggregate Demand and Macroeconomic Policy 
 
All the studies contained in this book make it clear that Japan’s most important economic 
policy objective is to achieve good, sustained, full employment growth.  This theme runs 
throughout this chapter as well. Certainly, while some of Japan’s slower growth has been due to 
changes on the supply side, a main thesis of this book is that Japan’s poor macroeconomic 
performance has been largely due to inadequate aggregate demand necessary to maintain full 
utilization of labor and other resources (see, for example, Amyx, 2004; Ihori and Sato, 2002; 
Mikitani and Posen, 2000; Posen, 1998). 
 Japan’s macroeconomic policy since 1991 has been one of extraordinary stimulus, but 
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 even this has been insufficient in what have become even more extraordinary circumstances.  
The government has run budget deficits of close to 6 - 8% annually since 1997.  Gross 
government debt now exceeds 161% of GDP though importantly, as Broda and Weinstein stress 
in chapter 2, the net debt actually is much lower because the government both owns substantial 
financial assets and on a consolidated basis owns a significant proportion of its own debt.  
Nonetheless, both gross and net debt levels will continue to rise for some time.  The Bank of 
Japan has reduced interest rates as much as possible, with the benchmark overnight bank call 
rate, analogous to the American federal funds rate, at zero.  Yet these macroeconomic policies 
have not been sufficient to prevent deflation, albeit mild, since the mid-1990s.  Even more 
importantly, between 1992 and 2003 Japan’s GDP averaged only 1.2% annual growth, 
substantially below its potential.  During that time there were three recessions followed by 
inadequate recoveries, including slightly negative growth (technical recession) for the middle 
two quarters of 2004, and only a slightly positive fourth quarter (though Japan’s quarterly GDP 
data are weak, and subsequent adjustments so substantial, that they are only rough indicators). 
 While it is true macroeconomic stimulus prevented a full-fledged financial crisis and 
collapse into a 1930s-style depression, that is no great achievement.  Other rich, advanced 
nations have gone through difficult economic times in the last half-century, but relative to its 
potential none has done so poorly for so long as Japan.  The lack of a successful 
macroeconomic policy has harmed all parts of the economy, and continues to do so. 
 The Japanese economy was particularly hurt by two major macroeconomic policy 
mistakes involving premature tightening.  The first, in early 1997, raised the consumption tax 
and other taxes while cutting government expenditures, a fiscal tightening swing of some 2% of 
GDP.  The second misstep occurred in August 2000 when the Bank of Japan raised interest 
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 rates in the midst of deflation, ending monetary ease; while the size of the rate increase was 
small, that action had a huge adverse effect on expectations. 
 Expanding aggregate demand continues to be essential.  Only this will narrow the 
supply-demand gap, restore true full employment, and foster more positive expectations about 
Japan’s economic future, the key to ending deflation.  Growth, as must be repeatedly stressed, 
is necessary both to affect the short-term contractionary effects of industrial restructuring and to 
provide the foundation for restructuring still weak banks, life insurance companies, and other 
financial institutions. 
 Although some policy analysts have continued to propose an even more aggressive 
short-term cyclical fiscal stimulus in order to revitalize the economy and ensure sustained 
recovery and growth, many observers consider increased government spending economically 
very inefficient, with too many wasteful pork-barrel public works projects. Building bridges, 
tunnels, dams, and reclaimed land in sparsely populated areas with little future demand for 
these services is worse than tax cuts, because the infrastructure investment not only results in 
construction debt but requires maintenance costs and labor misallocation for years to come.  
Overspending on public works, partly due to collusion in bidding, is widespread in Japan; most 
voters, even in areas where the proposed infrastructure is located, have become skeptical of the 
value of public works.  There has been little domestic call for fiscal stimulus through public 
works and, indeed, the share of GDP devoted to public infrastructure investment has declined 
steadily since the mid-1990s. 
 Fiscal stimulus proposals through tax cuts have gone nowhere because of deep 
Japanese anxiety about the persistent huge government budget deficits and the high gross 
government debt-to-GDP ratio.  The specter of a fiscal crisis sooner or later looms large in the 
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 media and the public consciousness, but apparently not in the presumably more sophisticated 
financial markets, where long-term interest rates on 20 year government bonds remain very low, 
around 2% or less. 
 A key policy dilemma is how to increase aggregate demand while curbing government 
budget deficits and the high government debt-to-GDP ratio.  Essentially this task is a matter of 
timing between the near-term versus the long-term.  Over the longer term Japanese saving 
rates will continue to decline and private business investment and personal consumption 
demand will rise sufficiently to end the output gap, restoring normal aggregate demand and full 
employment growth without requiring huge budget deficits.  Eventually as well, further 
near-term increases in the government debt ratio will end and then decrease.  These problems 
are manageable, both in the near- and long- term.  A key fiscal issue is whether in the long run 
the Japanese government will be able to achieve fiscal sustainability, namely to finance 
increasing expenditures as a proportion of GDP for the rising elderly share of the population 
while providing government services to the rest of its citizens as well.  The economic issue is 
how much government tax revenues will have to increase as a share of GDP to meet societal 
commitments; or how much these existing commitments will have to be cut in order to 
maintain incentives for firms and workers to stay in Japan; or how to alter income distribution. 
 In one of the most important and controversial studies in this volume, Broda and 
Weinstein in chapter 2 present a careful empirical analysis that argues Japan does not face a 
future fiscal crisis.  They found that the potential tax burden of long-term fiscal sustainability 
is much less dire than the Japanese government currently projects.  Broda and Weinstein 
estimate that, in due course, government revenues as a share of GDP will have to increase only 
modestly unless Japan decides to increase welfare levels to the equivalent of current European 
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 levels. 
 Broda and Weinstein base their analysis on several key points.  First, net government 
debt, not gross, is the correct measure of the government’s financial position.  It is necessary 
to subtract the Japanese government’s financial assets from its liabilities, and Japanese 
government institutions hold more than half the outstanding gross government debt.  For 
example, the government holds some $840 billion in foreign exchange reserves, which 
represents about 18% of GDP; these reserves are financed by government borrowing; and are 
basically a wash on the balance sheet of the government special accounts.  Broda and 
Weinstein estimate that the government’s net debt as of March 2002 was 64% of GDP.  They 
then use a more comprehensive public sector definition of the net debt, consolidating the 
central bank’s assets and liabilities (which reduces the net debt ratio to 46%) and the 
government’s unstated liabilities (based on the estimates of Doi and Hoshi, 2003) to arrive at a 
net public sector debt of 62%, which they use as their baseline estimate for long-term 
sustainability.  They argue there is no need to reduce this level; net debt can rise as rapidly as 
nominal GDP without causing problems. 
 In order to have government expenditures for all Japanese, old and young, increase at 
the same rate as GDP growth, Broda and Weinstein estimate that in the long run government 
revenues will have to be only 34.6% of GDP, almost the same ratio as in 1990 before tax cuts 
were enacted.  The OECD estimates that the average ratio of Japanese government revenues 
to GDP for 1980-2000 was 30.9%, and forecasts the ratio for 2004 to be 29.8%. 
 The Broda and Weinstein estimate of fiscal sustainability is based on reasonable 
assumptions.  These include the population projections made in an IMF study that fertility 
rates will eventually rise, that population decline will level off by 2060 and that the share of 
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 elderly will then remain constant.  The fiscal costs of paying benefits to the elderly during the 
period of demographic transition will be spread over 100 years, meaning that several Japanese 
generations will share these costs.  This assumption implies that the ratio of net (and gross) 
government debt will continue rising for some years before beginning to decline, but this 
increase is manageable.  Broda and Weinstein note that while the share of expenditures on the 
elderly will increase as they become a larger part of the population, total government 
expenditures on children will decrease as their numbers decline.  They also estimate 
sustainable tax rates under alternative, more stringent assumptions. 
 These relatively optimistic projections are indeed good news.  A fiscal crisis will not 
occur so long as people and institutions continue to believe that Japan can restore fiscal balance 
in the long run.  Tax revenues will have to rise, but only moderately, as a share of GDP.  
Normal growth will help to increase tax revenues from their current cyclical downturn, but tax 
rates will have to increase somewhat, though not a great deal unless Japan moves to a 
European-style welfare state or decides to finance the transition process for the elderly in a 
much shorter time frame.   
 Broda and Weinstein also make the important point that inflation has only a temporary 
effect upon reducing government debt, everything else remaining equal.  Inflation does not 
solve the long-run government debt problem since it only reduces the value of accumulated 
past government debt, not the government’s future liabilities embedded in its commitments to 
all Japanese, but especially to the elderly.  Moreover, although an inflationary doubling of the 
price level would halve the government’s gross debt, because so much debt is held by the 
government itself, the net reduction would be relatively small.  
 While fiscal stimulus may be desirable in the short-run, it is difficult to cut taxes now 
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 while planning to raise them later.  The political reality is that the LDP coalition government, 
which seems likely to remain in power until 2007, has rejected any additional fiscal stimulus 
measures.  Instead it has consistently attempted to keep the annual budget deficit to GDP level 
more or less constant, and has announced a medium-term goal of achieving a primary budget 
balance by 2012.  Broda and Weinstein assert that this goal is too extreme a tightening path, 
especially if the economy grows below potential. As with all long-term policy pronouncements, 
this may well be altered by changing events or new analyses. 
 
4  Monetary Policy 
 
This volume includes two important complementary chapters on monetary policy. Inadequate 
monetary policy is one of the most important factors in understanding the Japanese economy’s 
malaise in the 1990s and early 2000s.  The Bank of Japan was consistently behind the curve 
from 1993 to 2000, and made a key policy error in August 2000 by tightening money while 
deflation persisted.  Harrigan and Kuttner in chapter 3 convincingly argue that the Bank of 
Japan could have done better, if only it had known what the United States Federal Reserve 
would have done in a similar situation, as did indeed begin to occur in America in the early 
2000s.  Ito and Mishkin in chapter 4 provide a comprehensive set of policies for ending 
Japan's sustained deflation (see also Cargill et al, 1997 and 2000; OECD, 2004; and Mikitani 
and Posen, 2000). 
 As the Japanese economy fell into mild deflation in the mid-1990s, the need for more 
effective monetary policy increased.  Most mainstream economists believe that inflation and 
deflation are monetary phenomena in the long-run, and that a central bank can influence the 
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 course of the inflation rate, not by fine-tuning, but by achieving a medium-run average.  From 
this general viewpoint, the Bank of Japan’s failures to prevent deflation from setting in and then 
allowing it to remain for a prolonged period represent mismanaged monetary policy.  
Specifically, the timing of adopting the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) was late; additional 
actions while ZIRP was in place were taken too late, only sending tentative and at times 
inconsistent messages; and premature tightening in the midst of ongoing deflation was a major 
mistake.  Even with a zero interest rate, a central bank should influence expectations by 
promising a credible course of monetary policy and target inflation rates. 
 Harrigan and Kuttner compare the macroeconomic situations and monetary policy 
responses to the ending of asset price bubbles in Japan in 1991 and in the United States in 2000.  
Growth acceleration and stock price increases prior to the burst bubbles were similar in both 
countries.  Japanese fiscal balances improved during the boom years, but deteriorated in the 
down years, and the United States showed a similar pattern with even less favorable fiscal 
consequences.  One substantial difference is that Japan has been running current account 
surpluses in its balance of payments while the United States has been running increasingly large 
current account deficits in the years following the peak of its bubble. 
 Harrigan and Kuttner argue that monetary easing by the Bank of Japan after the 
bubble’s peak was slower than in the United States when measured by the respective actual 
interest rates adjusted for the inflation.  Japan’s delay in cutting the interest rate in the early 
post-bubble stages very likely contributed to the start of the long stagnation.  One mitigating 
factor is that in 1991 and 1992 actual disinflation exceeded expectations, so that failing to cut 
the interest rate more aggressively may be somewhat excused.  However, this excuse does not 
hold after 1993.  In particular, the Bank of Japan’s decision to keep the call rate unchanged at 
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 2.25% in 1994 and in the first quarter of 1995 actually contributed to a further decline in 
economic activity by slightly tightening monetary policy in real terms.  If in 1991-94 the Bank 
of Japan had acted like the Federal Reserve in 2001-04, disinflation may not have set in as 
rapidly as it did, and more aggressive interest rate cuts in 1994 and 1995 might have even 
prevented the eventual deflation that occurred and still persists. 
 Harrigan and Kuttner apply an econometric model of a central bank setting the interest 
rate in reaction to the gap GDP and the expected inflation rate, the so-called Taylor equation.  
Then they fit the Japanese data with the estimated American coefficients to determine what 
would have happened if the Bank of Japan had acted like the Federal Reserve.  They find that 
the interest rate would have been reduced to zero by mid-1993, and remained there at least 
through 1995.  They also critically review the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy from 1995 to 
2003 and find its response to deflation has been misguided, notably the rate hike in August 
2000, or long overdue, as evinced by the quantitative easing beginning only in March 2001. 
 There is no question the Bank of Japan’s very easy monetary policy currently in place 
should continue until sustained growth is restored and deflation ends.  Once sustained good 
economic performance is achieved, the appropriate monetary policy—when and how to exit the 
current policy of quantitative easing and zero overnight call market interest rates—is addressed 
in the chapter 4.  Ito and Mishkin argue for price-level targeting to catch up with the 
hypothetical trend line of 1% core CPI increases extending from the 1997 level.  (Given the 
upward bias of the CPI, a 1% rise in fact maintains price stability.)  This policy is 
history-dependent:  the longer deflation continues, the higher the average inflation rate will 
need to be during the catch-up period.  By committing to such a strategy, inflationary 
expectations will become higher as deflation persists (since the requisite “catch-up” will 
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 become greater).  This aspect of price-level targeting is particularly attractive in a period of 
deflation.  Once the price level catches up with the targeted trend line, Ito and Mishkin 
propose that the Bank of Japan shift to regular inflation-rate targeting, for the sake of simpler 
communication to the public. 
 The effective coordination of fiscal policy and monetary policy is a key for success in 
maximizing policy efforts.  In the early years following the Bank of Japan’s independence in 
1998, especially under Governor Masaru Hayami, relations between the Bank of Japan and its 
former master, the Ministry of Finance, were not smooth (see Ito, 2004). Bank of Japan 
executives resisted suggestions from the Ministry of Finance to ease monetary policy more 
aggressively as a threat to its independence, arguing instead that the Ministry’s fiscal policies 
should be more expansive.  However, the Ministry of Finance’s monetary policy suggestions 
turned out to be correct, and resisting them was a costly mistake.  Since April 2003, under 
Governor Toshihiko Fukui, the relationship has improved.  When the same message is sent 
both from the government and the Bank of Japan, and when fiscal policy and monetary policy 
actions are presented as a coordinated package, the effects on the economy will be maximized. 
 
5  Financial System Difficulties 
 
Japan’s macroeconomic difficulties have exacerbated the prolonged and profound weakening of 
it’s financial system, and this problem is analyzed in three related chapters: Hoshi and Kashyap 
consider the banking system, Fukao examines the life insurance industry, and Doi focuses on 
the government financial institutions.  What once was considered to be an extraordinarily 
large, strong and effective financial system has become one of the weakest among advanced 
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 industrial nations.  Virtually every Japanese financial institution has been overwhelmed by the 
major declines in stock and real estate prices, non-performing loans, very low interest rate 
spreads for banks, negative carry for life insurance companies, persistent if mild deflation, and 
the consequences of management mistakes. 
 In chapter 5 Hoshi and Kashyap stress that, despite huge write-offs of non-performing 
loans and improvements in the last few years, the capital position of almost all Japanese banks 
remains extraordinarily weak. Through mergers and failures the reduction from 20 big banks in 
1990 to 8 in 2004 has created even larger but not stronger banks.  Mergers have not yet 
resulted in substantial cost cutting or in the development of new, more effective business 
models.  Moreover, bank lending policies have worsened asset quality.  While total bank 
loans have decreased significantly, loans to very weak, large borrowers (called “zombie firms”) 
have been maintained and in some cases even increased.  Hoshi and Kashyap emphasize that 
under Minister Heizo Takenaka supervisory and regulatory reforms by the Financial Services 
Agency (FSA) to restructure bank balance sheets and identify and deal with non-performing 
loans have been a substantial improvement over the past, but should be further strengthened 
and pursued even more vigorously.  Nonetheless, these are only the first steps to restoring 
competitiveness and strength to Japanese banks.  Hoshi and Kashyap stress the reality that 
many banks remain undercapitalized and need to be recapitalized.  Several ways to capitalize 
banks have been proposed and implemented.  The government can inject capital into weak but 
solvent banks that are essential to the financial system’s stability or in regional banks to support 
the local economy, as has been done in the past.  If injected as shares, the government can sell 
these in the market, rather than having the bank pay the capital back to the government, in 
order to maintain capital. 
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  Japan’s banking system continues to be plagued by overbanking, resulting in very thin 
lending spreads and low profitability.  As Hoshi and Kashyap make clear in their policy 
recommendations, even ending deflation and restoring good economic growth will not be 
sufficient to create a competitive banking system within a reasonable time period.  Moreover, 
once the economy returns to normal and interest rates rise, Japanese banks will suffer losses on 
their immense government bond portfolios; it is not certain that gains in their stock holdings 
will be sufficient to cover these losses.  The major Japanese banks need both to improve their 
information technology infrastructure and to develop new, fee-based sources of income, still 
extraordinarily low by international comparison.  The traditional bank model of accepting 
deposits and lending these funds is no longer profitable since large, sound firms can raise funds 
and borrow through the capital market.  Japan’s banks are slow to adapt to a new deregulated 
environment by changing their business model, and this needs to change  (see Hoshi and 
Kashyap, 2001; Hoshi and Patrick, 2000; and Ishigaki and Hiro, 1998). 
 Bank restructuring has progressed more slowly for regional and local banking 
institutions, especially second-tier banks and credit associations, many of which continue to 
have severe non-performing loan problems.  The June 2004 legislation providing 2 trillion yen 
(about $18 billion) of government funds to facilitate bank rescues and mergers by injecting 
needed capital without declaring them insolvent signals that the Financial Services Agency is 
finally prepared to tackle regional bank balance sheet problems.  How strongly and effectively 
this agency will move, and how the politically powerful local banking institutions will respond, 
remains a serious concern. 
 In Japan the government is an exceptionally large financial intermediary.  The post 
office system, through postal savings accounts, holds some 30% of total household deposits and 
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 37% of the life insurance industry’s gross assets, both far larger amounts than held by any 
private financial institution. Some of these funds are invested in government bonds, but a 
significant portion, together with government-controlled monies, are transferred to a host of 
government financial institutions and special public corporations through the Ministry of 
Finance’s Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) and other channels which have recently 
been put in place by FILP reforms introduced in April 2001.  Nonetheless, these financial 
flows, and government financial institutions and special public corporation activities, have been 
very opaque. 
 In chapter 6 Doi provides the first careful, detailed English-language analysis of 
government financial institutions and special public corporations, each of which is a major 
source both of the burgeoning government debt and increases in government financial claims 
on the private sector.  However, these entities have huge non-performing loans (on the order 
of 36 trillion yen) which are yet to be addressed.  Doi focuses on 10 major government 
financial institutions and special public corporation, which together make about 20 % of total 
loans to the private sector and an even larger share for small business and for household 
mortgages. 
 As the economy has matured and the financial system has been fundamentally 
deregulated and liberalized, Doi stresses that many government financial institutions have 
become weak and redundant, and their economic rationales have evaporated.  Government 
financial institutions distort markets by competing unfairly with the private sector.  They are 
inefficient because their activities are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the government; 
this soft budget constraint means that deficits are inevitably covered by government subsidies.  
The potential liabilities of the government are open-ended, as there are no clear bankruptcy 
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 statutes for the government financial institutions or the special public corporations.   
 Doi identifies the specific set of problems for each major government financial 
institution or special public corporation and proposes appropriate solutions.  More broadly, he 
recommends that these government institutions be required to raise funds by selling their bonds 
in the market, as has only just begun, in order to impose market discipline.  However, so far 
the spreads show the market views these bonds as having at least an implicit government 
guarantee.  Doi also recommends that some institutions be closed and that the others be 
transformed into state-owned companies with limited liability and a hard budget constraint. 
 Reforming the postal system through privatization has long been a major priority for 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, despite opposition from many of his fellow LDP politicians 
who benefit from the local power of the special postmasters in some 24,000 post offices.  The 
Koizumi government now has underway proposals for major privatization of the postal system 
over a long-term (17-year) period (see Cargill and Yashiro, 2003). How this will play out 
politically and economically is not at all clear. Assuming some bill will be passed, what will be 
the specific details of privatization embodied in the legislation? How effective will they be? 
How will the post-Koizumi government actually implement or alter any policies enacted by the 
Koizumi administration. In our view, this will continue to be a contentious yet important issue 
for several more years. Nonetheless the major economic issues are clear. 
 Japan’s postal system has three business lines: mail delivery service, postal savings 
accounts, and postal life insurance.  Each function is a giant in its respective industry, so 
simple privatization will create huge institutions with strong market power, in conflict with a 
good solution in terms of competition policy.  Moreover, as Doi points out, cross-subsidies are 
a source of unfair competition.  However, separating each business line into regional divisions 
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 could reduce the value of the services provided to households. 
  The incumbent provider of postal delivery services, the Ministry of Public 
Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, argues that mail service should be 
universal, and that private-sector entrants should be required to provide universal service.  
This stance would make new-entry prohibitively expensive.  Package deliveries are 
competitive markets, as several private-sector delivery services and the postal system compete 
with each other.  Private companies argue that the postal system has an unfair advantage 
because it does not pay taxes on their real estate holding or profits. 
 The postal savings and postal life insurance systems compete directly and powerfully 
with private financial institutions.  In an effort to deregulate and privatize postal financial 
services, there are several absolutely necessary requirements, and others that are more 
controversial.  The first requirement in reforming the postal saving system is that it should 
have to pay the same deposit insurance premium as banks. This change would achieve a level 
playing field and eliminate the government’s current free guarantee of deposits.  The postal 
savings system may be effective in collecting deposits, but it has little expertise in the portfolio 
management of these funds; it has no capability to make efficient, informed loan decisions.  
However, the Ministry of Finance wants the postal system to expand into lending operations.  
Doi proposes that the system be transformed into a narrow bank, that accepts savings deposits 
but only holds government bonds as assets.  This would obviate any increases in banking 
services in an already over-crowded financial system, and eliminate the need to develop 
expertise in providing lending services.  It also eliminates the threat of market power, while 
providing depositors with safe assets and the government with continued ready access to 
household savings. 
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  In his chapter on the life insurance industry, Fukao incorporates an analysis of the 
government postal life insurance system (Kampo), which controls more assets than the five 
largest private companies combined.  Kampo receives substantial government subsidies, 
explicit and implicit, including tax exemption, government guarantees, and cross-selling with 
deposits.  These subsidies should be addressed first.  How to privatize postal life insurance 
while ending its excessive market power is one of the key challenges of any privatization 
program. 
 Fukao paints a stark picture of the life insurance industry from the 1990s to the present.  
The private-sector now comprises some 40 companies of which many are new entrants, both 
Japanese and foreign firms, following reduced entry restrictions in the 1990s.  Seven 
traditional companies failed in the 1990s due to weak management of interest rate risks, 
excessive exposure to stock market declines, perverse incentives, and lax regulatory 
supervision; in fact, though not reported at the time, these firms were deeply insolvent when 
they went bankrupt and were sold off. 
 Fukao focuses on the 10 major companies that together now have a dominant market 
share of the life insurance industry.  The fundamental problem for all these firms is negative 
carry, the fact that the guaranteed rates of return on policies sold prior to the mid-1990s are 
substantially above the current rates of return on company assets in Japan’s low interest-rate 
environment.  As a consequence, these life insurance companies are suffering losses and 
depletion of their capital.  Fukao shows that the adjusted solvency ratios are substantially 
weaker than reported, and several companies are in considerable difficulty.  If negative carry 
persists, more firms may go bankrupt or be forced to reduce the guaranteed rates to 
policyholders, the latter of which is now allowed but will have adversely affect their reputations 
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 in increasingly competitive markets. 
 Fukao also analyzes the problems of this industry’s poor asset-liability management, 
weak corporate governance, weak regulatory supervision, double-gearing between life 
insurance companies and banks, and the market distortions generated by Kampo.  He proposes 
a range of policies to restore the industry’s strength, including more effective supervision and 
regulation, ending the inclusion of deferred tax assets in the measurement of their capital, and 
the prohibition of double gearing. 
 Chapters 5-7 make clear how significant the remaining problems of financial system 
reform are, and propose what should be done.  Structural reform of Japan’s banks, life 
insurance companies, and especially its government financial institutions is essential to 
overcome distortions in resource allocation and economic activities. 
 
6  Corporate Restructuring and Financing 
 
All sectors, companies, and households have suffered through Japan’s long period of economic 
malaise.  Credit is the life blood of all businesses, and the banking system’s profound 
weaknesses have had great adverse spill-over effects on all economic activity, as Iwaisako 
discusses in his chapter analyzing business investment and restructuring.  Well functioning, 
competitive banking and financial systems are essential to allocate resources more efficiently 
so as to increase GDP. 
  Although corporate restructuring has made some progress, much remains to be done 
before Japan can become a normal, efficient economy based on competitive markets  
unimpeded by large amounts of nonperforming assets.  The average return on equity remains 
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 low in international comparison, and the gap between strong and weak firms in all size 
categories has widened.  In addition to the highly publicized cases of very large, inefficient, 
heavily indebted zombie firms subsisting on credit rollover and new injections from main 
banks, many small- and medium-sized enterprises remain weak due to a combination of 
still-huge debt burdens and lost competitiveness in a changing domestic and global business 
environment. The government made progress on this front by creating the Industrial 
Revitalization Corporation Japan in April 2003, a semi-public arm of corporate restructuring. 
Together with the main banks, it takes stakes in and restructures the overly-indebted companies.  
Firms with good cash flow have focused primarily on paying down debt to restore balance 
sheets.  However, too many firms have yet to develop, much less implement, more effective 
business models.  Restructuring inefficient government special corporations and agencies so 
far has been quite slow.  These problems will endure even after the private-sector economy 
returns to a stable equilibrium growth path. 
 Iwaisako notes that business investment has slowed to about 15% of GDP, but is still 
higher than in the United States and certainly high relative to the GDP growth rate.  The 
slowdown in business investment was due primarily to lack of business demand and the need to 
restore balance sheet equilibrium by paying down debt, despite a brief credit crunch in late 
1997 and early 1998.  Iwaisako identifies as a major problem the slowdown in productivity 
growth, due in part to the slowdown in the reallocation of capital and labor across industries.  
He identifies the misallocation of bank credit as a serious problem.  Because banks are weak 
and insiders in the non-performing loan problems, they have continued lending to weak 
borrowers, termed evergreening.  Banks have not been able to engage in their earlier 
monitoring and restructuring roles as outside, objective arbiters. 
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  New private financial institutions engaged in business restructuring have developed 
only since the late 1990s.  Not surprisingly, restructuring brings to the fore conflicts between 
conventional business practices based on management control and the painful requirements of 
restructuring and of new corporate governance modes.  Most restructuring has been taking 
place through normal private-market mechanisms and this is desirable.  Government policies 
have been supportive, especially in legal and institutional changes to make management 
decision choices, corporate governance, and capital markets more effective. 
 Yet government policies to deal with the asset management difficulties of large, 
virtually insolvent Japanese companies have been ad hoc and partial. This is in stark contrast to  
countries such as Korea, in which a government asset management company was established 
and required to purchase bad bank loans, with the government temporarily taking over majority 
ownership of the banks.  The Japanese government established the Reconstruction and 
Collection Corporation in the mid-1990s, but it has served mainly to take over non-performing 
loans of financial institutions in difficulty, and has not concentrated much on the restructuring 
of the corporate borrowers.  The Industrial Revitalization Corporation Japan is more active in 
restructuring large companies but inevitably will have a relatively limited direct role since it 
has only a five year charter. 
 Iwaisako considers two important cases of government intervention in restructuring 
corporate debt.  One is the nationalization of the Long-Term Credit Bank, the terms of its 
eventual sale to Ripplewood, and its re-establishment as Shinsei Bank.  He notes that the 
government and business community were implicitly expecting Shinsei to play according to the 
existing game, in effect to keep lending to existing borrowers regardless of quality, not to 
exercise the put option on non-performing loans they had taken on, and in general not to rock 
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 the boat.  Instead Shinsei behaved as a rational economic actor.  This incurred the wrath of 
traditionalists, but was ultimately a successful strategy.  The second case was the placing of 
the excessively diversified, heavily indebted Kanebo into the Industrial Revitalization 
Corporation Japan process in mid-2004. Management was changed, equity was written off as 
were a considerable portion of the bank loans, the successful cosmetics division is being sold, 
and the non-profitable divisions are being restructured, sold or closed. 
 Iwaisako draws several conclusions.  Restructuring often needs a third, outside, party 
that is not involved in embedded and tangled long-term relationships among the company, its 
main banks, and other interested players.  Government intervention should be limited in order 
not to crowd out private market restructuring efforts; it is desirable only when there are obvious 
market failures, as generous government bail-outs come at the expense of taxpayers and healthy 
competitors.  He judges the Industrial Revitalization Corporation Japan to have been 
successful.  However, Iwaisako is more skeptical of the increasingly extensive restructuring 
activities of the Development Bank of Japan, which is more vulnerable to political pressure and 
because its objective to ensure its own survival may be more important than efficient resource 
allocation. 
 Efficient corporate restructuring usually involves downsizing, including reducing the 
numbers of employees.  In Japan, job cuts have been mostly through natural attrition and, in 
extreme cases, early retirement buy-outs.  As Higuchi and Hashimoto discuss in chapter 10, 
labor market adjustments inevitably are specific, depending on age, skill, gender, and 
geographical location.  They propose programs to enhance labor mobility, including training 
programs to ensure the smooth transition of workers to new employers rather than trying to 
protect existing jobs.  They also emphasize the importance of good GDP growth to reduce 
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 unemployment, increase labor force participation rates through new employment, and make the 
reallocation of labor easier. 
 Most Japanese corporate finance has continued to be provided by banks and, 
especially for small- and medium-sized enterprises, government financial institutions.  The 
government’s Big Bang policies of the late 1990s have accelerated the development of capital 
markets.  Nonetheless, the Tokyo capital market is still relatively costly, and the legal 
framework does not adhere to international best practices. Its rules and regulations are not 
foreigner-friendly; prospectuses and balance sheets have to be written in Japanese.  Stock 
transactions and registrations are now electronically based, registration of ownership can be 
done with the stock depository, and changes in ownership are much easier than before.  
Further development of the Tokyo capital market is necessary. 
 In chapter 9 Fujii analyzes the development of Japan’s corporate bond market since the 
late 1990s, which is important because bond issuance will become a significant source of 
business finance, as it is in other advanced countries.  She uses her own survey of participants 
in the Tokyo capital market, and analyzes market effectiveness through bond pricing models.  
Respondents identified taxation issues and lack of human capital (professional expertise) as 
major problems. 
 Prior to deregulation culminating in the Big Bang financial reforms, regulations 
restricted corporate bond issues to only a few top-class companies.  Now government 
restrictions on corporate bond issuance are minimal, and previously high issuance costs have 
been reduced substantially.  However, a market has not yet developed for high yield, below 
investment-grade, bonds.  Nor has an appropriately priced middle-market evolved for more 
risky bank loans.  Fujii concludes that corporate bond market pricing is working reasonably 
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 well because prices and their credit-default swaps are consistent based on monthly data.  
Estimates of changes in the implied ratings by credit rating agencies and their actual bond 
ratings move together quite closely.  Nonetheless, liquidity remains low.   
Fujii recommends that Japan’s government encourage the private market by leaving it 
alone, while making appropriate changes in the tax code to ensure that tax treatment is equal 
and neutral.  Market participants, Japanese and foreign, have to develop and apply 
increasingly sophisticated financial technology, rather than relying on government policy 
prescriptions.  She recommends that the government stay away from attempting to regulate 
high-risk markets, such as venture capital, distressed assets, and high-yield bonds.  Of course 
there are areas where the government regulators should take useful initiatives, such as 
providing a more efficient settlement system and specific measures to reduce barriers that raise 
administrative costs. 
 
7  Japan’s New Trade Policy 
 
Japan’s foreign economic policy has long been founded on its comprehensive security, political, 
and economic alliance with the United States; its commitment to an open, globally multilateral 
trading system under the first General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and how its successor 
the World Trade Organization; and the market-based system of global financial and direct 
investment flows (see Lincoln, 1999).  Japan and the United States have provided learning 
experiences and models for each other, as exemplified in this volume by the Harrigan and 
Kuttner chapter on lessons for American macroeconomic policies taken from Japan’s 
experience with deflation.  These approaches and commitments have not changed.  However, 
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 a new strategic dimension has emerged in response to the increasing reliance on regional 
trading arrangements by the United States and the European Union, and due to China’s rise as 
an economic power.  Japan also has embarked on a new trade policy, one of bilateral 
cooperation under free trade agreements or, more comprehensively, economic partnership 
agreements. 
 Traditionally, Asian countries have not formed significant preferential trading 
arrangements.  The ASEAN Free Trade Area is a regional trade agreement, but the lowering of 
tariffs among its 10 Southeast Asian members has been slow.  Japan, Korea, and China were 
the only three outliers, as they had not joined any regional preferential agreements.  Japan’s 
first free trade agreement, with Singapore, became effective in 2002.  Korea concluded its first 
negotiated free trade agreement, with Chile, in 2004.  Now there are frenzied free trade 
negotiations among all the Asian nations.  China has just signed a free trade agreement with 
ASEAN.  Thailand is negotiating more than a dozen free trade agreements.  The United 
States has negotiated a free trade agreement with Singapore and Australia.  Japan signed one 
with Mexico in 2004, and is negotiating separately with the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Korea, as well as with ASEAN as a group.  How these will shape trading arrangements in 
Asia remains to be seen. 
 In chapter 11 Urata explains Japan’s trade policy motivations and strategy, and 
strongly recommends that Japan pursue free trade agreements in a manner complementary to 
the World Trade Organization.  One reason is defensive.  In the worst case scenario, Japan 
may become isolated from a world characterized by three dominant free trade zones --the 
greatly expanded European Union; the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
governing Canada, Mexico and the United States, the proposed Free Trade Area of the 
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 Americas and ongoing American bilateral free trade negotiations; and an expanded ASEAN 
Free Trade Area with an increasingly powerful China.  Another motivation arises from Japan’s 
increasing policy focus on East Asia, the world’s most rapidly growing economic region.  The 
1997-98 currency, financial, and economic crisis greatly increased East Asian interest in greater 
regional economic cooperation.  Urata argues that free trade agreements will both expand 
Japan’s market access in trade and investment and contribute to Asian economic growth.  
Japan’s policy approach is more comprehensive than liberalizing trade barriers; it focuses on 
investment, movements of skilled workers, and facilitation and cooperation in a range of areas.  
In this respect, Japan aims to support the global system by addressing and testing solutions to a 
range of international economic issues not currently covered by the World Trade Organization.  
At its best, in Urata’s view, an effective policy of free trade agreements can be a catalyst for 
Japan’s economic revitalization. 
 Urata recognizes that the strongest Japanese opponents to this new free trade policy 
are the powerful domestic protectionist forces and lobbies, particularly in agriculture, fisheries, 
and other labor-intensive sectors which are Japan’s most economically inefficient industries.  
The conflicts between these sectors and other business and industrial interests have become 
increasingly open and pronounced, in part due to the negotiation realities of free trade 
agreements.  For some, the free trade approach reflects foreign pressure (gaiatsu) to force 
changes that are overdue on these domestic issues.  Japan needs a fundamental reform in its 
approach to these inefficient sectors, perhaps by shifting to a system of guaranteed income 
subsidies for existing farmers combined with free imports and acceptance of world prices that 
will benefit consumer welfare.  Even without dramatic policy solutions, these sectors will 
gradually weaken due to a lack of interest among young people in working in them, and 
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 domestic policies will have to move toward a more efficient resource allocation.  The question 
is how soon and how efficiently these changes will occur.  Until Japanese policy makers can 
overcome the domestic protectionist forces, it will be very difficult to pursue and implement a 
comprehensive free trade strategy because Japan’s trading partners will insist on access to these 
protected markets. 
 
8  Major Policy Recommendations 
 
Comprehensive and detailed policy recommendations are made by the chapters' authors, 
founded on their careful analysis.  We do not attempt to summarize their recommendations 
here, but offer a few broad near-term and medium to long-term policy recommendations based 
on the analyses provided in this volume. 
 Japan’s highest priority in the near-term is to end deflation and put its economy back 
on a good, sustainable growth track, still far from being achieved as of the beginning of 2005.  
Since a substantial output gap still exists, growing above its long term potential for a few years 
will not cause substantial inflation.  Growth should be supported by monetary and fiscal 
policy to ensure adequate aggregate demand.  Until the price-level target described by Ito and 
Mishkin is achieved, continuing the zero interest rate policy and quantitative easing is 
appropriate.  The Bank of Japan should learn from the United States Federal Reserve Board in 
carefully avoiding deflation as well as inflation, as suggested by Harrigan and Kuttner.  Once 
sustained growth is achieved, the fiscal situation can be dealt with in the medium and longer- 
run, as Broda and Weinstein show. 
 Restoring health to banks and insurance companies is another key task to getting the 
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 economy back on track.  Hoshi and Kashyap, and Fukao, in their respective studies, 
emphasize the importance of rigorous supervision and regulation, together with rigorous 
implementation by the Financial Services Agency to restore financial institution balance sheets 
and to create the right incentives.  Regional and local banking institutions in particular need to 
reduce their still-high non-performing loans, which entail substantial restructuring, merger and 
consolidation.  Solvency margin regulations and rules for life insurance companies have to be 
tightened, as Fukao strongly asserts. 
 We do not endorse the “cleansing view” that recessions effectively and naturally 
improve resource allocations and bring about adequate structural reform, and indeed Japan’s 
past 14 years of malaise indicate that is not the result.  As the economy recovers, reforming 
and restructuring policies and efforts should be strengthened for all financial institutions and 
businesses, private and governmental.  The full and effective utilization of labor in appropriate 
jobs, as detailed by Higuchi and Hashimoto, and the effective reallocation of capital as 
emphasized by Iwaisako, is the way to enhance productivity improvements and achieve better 
growth in both the near and medium terms.  In particular the creation of better job 
opportunities for younger Japanese workers is essential to maintaining a highly skilled labor 
force.  In addition, existing market and social norms have meant that in Japan female labor is 
not allocated well.  Institutional support for child-bearing and child-caring women is essential 
to take advantage of their potential productivities, and appropriate policies could increase the 
incentives to have children, thereby raising the fertility rate.  Better-functioning capital 
markets, especially the further development of the corporate bond market, will contribute to the 
more effective allocation of resources, as Fujii argues. 
 In the medium to longer-term, once deflation is over and sustained growth is achieved, 
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 the Bank of Japan should adopt some form of inflation targeting, preferably explicit, as is 
proposed by Ito and Mishkin.  Then it will be possible to reduce, even eliminate, government 
budget deficits, and stabilize the government gross and net debt ratios relative to gross 
domestic product.  As Broda and Weinstein show, fiscal sustainability can be achieved without 
huge increases in taxes so long as the transition costs are financed over a sufficiently long time 
period. Structural reforms of the government financial institutions and special public 
corporations, and of local government institutions, as Doi forcefully argues, are essential in 
order to allocate resources more efficiently and to reduce the government’s contingent 
liabilities inherent in the existing soft budget system. For social and political reasons, reforming 
government institutions cannot be accomplished quickly, but the process has to begin and be 
strengthened now.  The Japanese government’s fiscal difficulties provide policy makers an 
incentive to make the difficult decisions the governmental reforms necessarily entail. 
 Two aspects of Japan’s relations with other countries, particularly those in Asia, are 
especially significant in the medium to longer term.  One is the development of free trade 
agreements and, more precisely, economic partnership agreements to liberalize trade and 
investment flows, as Urata argues.  The deepening of Japan’s economic integration with its 
neighbors has significant political and security implications that probably exceed these 
economic benefits.  The other aspect is for Japanese to decide what is the appropriate role of 
foreign workers in their economy.  In an immediate context, in free trade agreement 
discussions with Japan, the demands of Thailand and the Philippines for liberalized worker 
visas are stimulating Japanese debate over these issues, with a generally positive view. But in 
the longer-run with Japan’s aging and declining population looming, the issue of how and to 
what degree to allow and even encourage foreign-worker immigration must be squarely faced. 
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  We are confident that in due course the Japanese economy can and will rise again.  
The nation’s economic and social fundamentals are still strong.  As the government and 
private sectors accept and implement the policy recommendations contained in this volume, the 
economy will do better on both the demand and supply sides.  While Japan’s near-term growth 
potential is quite high because of under-utilized labor and other resources, even in the 
longer-run it is not only quite likely but probable that the Japanese will achieve per capita GDP 
growth rates at least as good as is the average for the other G7 countries. Japan will continue to 
be a major global economic player and technology leader, far ahead of the rest of Asia and 
second only to the United States. And the standard of living and economic well-being of Japan 
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